Bingham and Garfield Railway v. North Utah Mining Company of Bingham: Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Bingham and Garfield Railway v. North Utah
Mining Company of Bingham: Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dickson, Ellis, Ellis and Schulder; Attorneys for Appellant.
Unknown.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Garfield Railway v. North Utah Mining Company, No. 2877.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1
u lf U T , i -.)UPRt.ME COU 
DOCL"v1ENT 
KFU ·. lEE 
' ~\1 A-R-6 .·, , . · .. ·. \~· 
' ·. \_ , I\. 
............... .., "" 
vs. 
NORTH t1TAH lUNING COMPANY OF BINGHAM~ 
a. Cotp,ora.fion~ the RIGHT HO.NORAflLE WILL-
I.AllBOOD L01ro WALERAN i ~ ... e.. HONORABLE 
~YIUL.A. LIDDL:El and WILL.La:M BOBB'IN'S, 
REPlY E OF APPEWNT 
' 
DICKSPNr J;.LLIS, ELLIS ~t-'ScHuLDER, 
Attornl!1JS for Appellant. 
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fendants hereinbefore described and the whole thereof 
for an easement for the erection of structures necessarily 
incident to the operation of said railway, and for a right 
of way for the construction, maintenance and operation 
of said railway * * *" and in paragraph 10, "that the title 
desired and required by the plaintiff in said premises 
sought to be obtained is a permanent right of way and 
easement for the purposes aforesaid" (Ab. 5 and 6), 
and in the amendment to the amended complaint: ''That 
the title desired and required by the plaintiff in said 
premises sought to be condemned is a permanent right 
of way and easement for the purposes aforesaid" (A b. 
11.) Which allegations were specifically and positively 
denied by the answer of all the defendants other than 
Robbins as follows: Deny each and every allegation 
contained in paragraplls 8, 9 and 10 of plaintiff's said 
complaint, (Ab. 12), and for lack of knowledge by the de-
fendant Robbins (Ab. 15) without any proof whatsoever 
on the part of the plaintiff showing the necessity there-
for, and without any evidence being introduced in the 
case as to such necessity, p,ither as to area or extent, that 
the plaintiff, regardless of whether it could show any ne-
cessity for large portions of said tracts mentioned and 
described in its said complaint, or for the exclusive posses-
sion thet·eof, was (and is, by the moneyed judgment ren-
dered in this action) compelled to take and pay for the 
said lands, the whole thereof, and for the exclusive posses-
sion and occupancy of the same. 
This position is not only in contravention of all of 
the adjudicated cases upon the subject, but contravenes 
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the constitution of the State of Utah and its statutes, be-
cause, if the plaintiff could not show a necessity for the 
taking of the property mentioned and described in its 
complaint, it could not condemn the same. ' The question 
of the necessity of the taking was directly put in issue by 
both of the answers of the respective defendants in these 
actions. 'l'hat issue having been raised by the pleadings, 
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show such 
necessity, and without such a showing the court was 
powerless to enter a judgment condemning said lands in 
favor of the plaintiff and assessing damages for the tak-
ing of said lands in favor of the defendants. As was said 
in the ease of Beaulieu Vineyard et al. vs. Superior Court 
of Nappa County, et al., 6 Cal. App. Reports, page 248: 
''All of the allegations of the amended complaint 
were put in issue by the answer, hence it was 
neeessary to find upon every material averment. 
The necessity for the taking of the land, or any 
portio nof it, was denied by the defendants. Pe-
titioners made no demand that this issue should 
be submitted to the jury. In fact, petitioners are 
here contending that the only issue to be decided 
was as to the value of the land to be condemned 
and the damage to the residue, but we determine 
what the issues arP by an inspection of the 
pleadings.'' 
Southeru Pae. R. R. Co. v. Raymond, 53 
Cal. 233; 
City of Pasadena v. ~timson, 91 Cal. 253, 
(27 Pac. 604); 
Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 
528, (28 Pac. 681); 
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City of Santa Ana v. Gildmacher, 133 Cal. 
339, (65 Pac. 883). 
The question of the necessity in the case at bar was 
also directly in issue, but unlike California, that question 
under the laws of Utah must be passed upon and de-
cided solely by the court, and cannot be submitted to 
the jury. 
Section 3591 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, 
provides as follows: 
'' Canditions precedent to condemnation: Before 
property can be taken it must appear: 
"1. That the use to which it is applied is a use au-
thorized by law.'' 
Which was admitted in the answer of the defendant 
North Utah Mining Company and waived by all of the 
defendants at the time of the trial of the action. 
'' 2. That the taking is necessary to such use. 
"3. If alreadv appropriated to some public use, 
that the public use to which it is to be applied is 
a more necessary public use.'' 
And Section 3596, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, pro-
vides: 
"Power of the Court. The Court or judge thereof 
shall have power: 
'' 1. To determine the conditions specified in 3591. '' 
We respectfully submit that the record shows that 
the court never iletermined upon any proof whatever 
"that the taking is necessary to such use" either before 
or after the submission of this case to the jury, but in the 
absence of any proof whatever instructed the jury to 
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assess damages in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff (upon the theory and erroneous view of the 
law, and contrary to this statute and without any deter-
mination whatsoever as to the extent of the area neces-
sary to be used by the plaintiff for the erection, mainte-
nance and operation of its line of railway, particularly 
across and oYer Tract "A") that the whole of said 
Tract ''A'' was necesasry to be taken by the plaintiff, 
and that the defendants should receive compensation 
upon the basis that the whole of said Tract "A" was so 
taken and upon the theory of exclusive use, possession 
and occupancy thereof by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff realized at the very outset of the trial that 
it was impossible for it to show or prove that it was 
necessary or essential for it to condemn the whole of 
"Tract 'A'" as alleged in its complaint, or show a 
necessity for the exclusive use or occupancy of the same, 
except where its concrete abutments stood. This is shown 
early in the trial in the cross-examination of the third 
witness placed upon the witness stand by the defendants, 
where the following occurs: 
'' Q. Now, I wish you would state what effect, if 
any, the building of the bridge, the abutment, and the 
piers, had upon the dump room there', the dumping ground 
included within this No. 1 tunnel7 
A. It had no special bearing on the ability to dump 
on the ground, except, as I understand it, the railroad 
company won't allow you to dump on their right of way. 
I understand that. 
Q. Well, was that a practical dumping ground be-
fore the bridge was built 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. How would you say that portion of the ground 
over which the bridge is built compares, as to its dump-
i:!l~ £a(?i!itic•s, h th~ ot!~er gTonT>.~l, ~jthe-,. east O!" ':'!~st¥ 
A. It is more favorable for dumping, because it is 
not so steep a slope. 
To dump on the ground to the east or west of the 
right of way you have to go clear to the foot of the hill. 
Q. What would you say was the effect of the opera-
tion of this ground included within this No. 1 tunnel, and 
what is designated there as the Robbins stope, by the 
building of this road, the tunnel and bridge, the abut-
ments and piers? 
A. ~What effect would the railroad company have 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. It would have no effect. 
Q. What did yon mean 1 
A. I mean to state that the fact of the piers and 
railroad bridge being on that ground will not prevent any-
body from dumping there, hut the fact of being on the 
right of way, and the railroad company not allowing 
theer to dump there, you can't dump there, and conse-
quently you can't get away with your waste. That is 
what I moan. It would prevent the working of the 
ground.'' 
(See Talmage, Ahs. 64, 63, 66, 219.) 
Without any determination by the court as to the ex-
tent of Tract "A" necessary to he taken by the plaintiff, 
the defendants and the co1trt erroneously assmned that 
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because the plaintiff had asked in its complaint for the 
whole of Tract ''A'', that it could and would prove that 
the whole of such tract was necessary to the use for 
which the action was started. Surely the plaintiff should 
IJ.O~ ~~e t"J-uiii"! !Y;- ~l1is erroncc~J ~ss~n~ptlon inG.::l;;8d in 
by counsel for the defendants and the trial court, and re-
quired to pay for land which it could not prove was 
necesm;ry for its railroad, and which it does not want 
and can not use. It is self-evident that it is no more es-
sential for the plaintiff to have a strip of land fifty feet 
wide on each side of the abutments and steel work of its 
trestle across Markham Gulch, than it would be neces-
sary or essential for it to have one thousand feet on each 
side of ::;ueh abutments and trestle work The only 
ground which was essential for it to have, and for which 
it could show a necessity, was the area actually covered 
by the concrete abutments and upon which the steel tres-
tle work was erected. It would be just as reasonable to 
contend that an elevated street railway in a city, and con-
structed along a public thoroughfare, was compelled to 
take and pay for and could condemn the entire street over 
which such elevated railroad was built and constructed. 
It is intimated in the briefs of counsel for all of the 
defendants that it would be flangerous to dump earth, 
rock or waste against the conerete abutments. To over-
eome any such contention the plaintiff offered to prove 
that to flump earth, rock or material against such abut-
ments would not in any way affeet the abutments nor the 
safety of the railroad operation or maintenance. (Abs. 
390.) The court refused to permit such proof and its 
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error in so refusing is simply emphasized by the argu-
ments of defendants' counsel referred to. 
It is true the court granted to the plaintiff temporary 
orders of possession as to all of the defendants, which will 
be found on pages 685-688 of the record. These orders, 
however, were in no way conclusive as to the extent of 
the use or area which should be finally condemned upon 
the trial of the action, and our statute expressly reserves 
such question until the final determination of the action, 
and the orders of possession are merely temporary. It 
was therefore the duty of the court to determine what 
part or portion of the lands mentioned and described in 
the complaint of the plaintiff were necessary to be taken 
for the use of the railroad company; in other words, as 
was said in the case of Beaulieu Vineyard et al. vs. Su-
perior Court of Nappa County, et al., quoting from the 
syllabus: 
"Duty of court to determine necessity. Orderly pro-
cedure. Under the circumstances shown by the 
record, the court had not only the jurisdiction, 
but it was its duty to determine the question of 
fact, whether any, and if so what, part of the 
land was necessary for the purpose of the plain-
tiff. The more orderly procedure would be for 
the court to have allowed the amendment asked 
at the trial, or to have found upon the question 
of necessity before the issue of eompensation 
was submitted to the jury, and Judge Burnett, 
in his opinion says: 'Under the circumstances 
shown by the record, the court not only had the 
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jurisdiction, but it was its duty to determine the 
question of fact-whether any, and if so what, 
portion of the land was necessary for the pur-
pose of the plaintiff.' " 
See also Madera Ry. Co. vs. Raymond Granite Co. 
3 Cal. App. 677. 
See also 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, Sec. 599-600. 
In the case at bar, however, the court would not per-
mit the plaintiff to introduce any evidence whatsoever to 
show what part or portion of Tract "A" was necessary 
to the liSe for which said lands were sought to be con-
demned, but held without any proof whatsoever (except 
the allegation in the complaint, which was denied by the 
defendant), that the plaintiff must take the whole of the 
tracts described in its complaint, whether the same were 
necessary or not, and that it must take the exclusive 
possession and occupancy thereof, and pay to the defen-
dants for the whole of said tract and for the exclusive 
possession and occupancy thereof, although it did not 
desire to the whole of said tract, or the right to the ex-
clusive possession and occupancy thereof. 
We believe that the weight of authority, both in 
cases and in reason, is with the plaintiff, that where stat-
utes provide that only an easement is taken (Sec. 3589) 
that only such easement is taken, and that the condemnor 
does not, by virtue of such easement, obtain the fee title 
to said lands, or the exclusive right to the possession and 
occupancy of the same, as matter of law. We admitted 
in oral argument and in our original brief that there were 
cases which announced such a doctrine and other cases 
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which use language which might be found to be favorable 
to the contention of the defendants, but all such cases 
were decided upon an entirely different set of facts than 
the fads disclosed by the record in this case, and were 
eas..,.;; w~wre [lie use to .. W~iich the v\Vilt'l o; i,l1e prOLi€.t'ty 
condemned sought to put said lands was disputed by the 
railroad company, and the railroad company contended 
that such usc by the owner would interfere with its ease-
mPnt in sueh lands, and nonP of such cases are where the 
railroad eompan.v was not only willing, but desired the 
owner of the property to use it for the purposes for 
which the owner claimed and sought damages. 
Counst>l for the respondent Robbins on page 6 of 
his brief quotes a portion of a paragraph from 15 Cyc. 
pages 102:3-1024, a portion of which quotation is as 
foJlows: 
'' '' * *or the court in its order, limits the easement to 
he aequi.rcd hy reserving certain rights and priv-
ileg(c'S to the land owner or unless such limita-
tion is coneeded by the company.'' 
'I'he plaintiff not onl.v conceded, in this action, the 
right of the oefendants to use the premises for which it 
sought aml claimed damages, but expressly agreed that 
the onler of condemnation should be entered so as to 
permit the use in common by the defendants in this ac-
tion, and their successors in interest of the ground, 
"lands and premises embraced in the confines of Tract 
'A' so that they rnay durnp earth, waste and rnaterial 
upon Tract' A' * * *" (See Abs. 391.) 
Said paragraph in c~'C, continues as follows: 
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''This rule has, in some jurisdictions, been so far 
modified as to allow the land owner to enter 
upon and use the land for any purpose not in-
consistent with its use by the company for any 
of the objects which the railroad is intended to 
~ "rr-----l:rl, " 
Ll.\...-'V't.)J .. LL J.J'~..ll...' LJ.. 
He also quotes a small portion from Section 847, 
Vol. 2, Lewis on Eminent Domain, the whole of which sec-
tion reads as follows: 
''Whether the company's posse>ssion is exclusive. 
Rights of fee own<'r. There is no question but 
that the company is entitle(] to the exclusive 
pm;session of the right of way, if SUl~h posses-
sion is nl~cessary to the proper operation of the 
road. RomP courts hold that the company is en-
titled to such f'xclusive possession from the na-
ture of the case and as matter of law. Other 
courts holtl that it is a question of fact whether 
the necessities of the company require the ex-
clusive occupaney of the right of way, and what 
use of tlw same by the owner of the fee is not 
inconsistent with the company's rights. The su-
prf'mn court of Connectieut, after referring to 
the latter doetrine, says: 'Our statutes that re-
quire all railroad eompanies (under eertain 
qualifications) to build continuous fences on 
both sides of their roads, imply that their 
possession is exdusivc, and that adjoining land-
owners have no greater rights than others; for, 
if the law is as claimed, then the right of the 
landowner to make entry on thf' track would not 
be confined to regular plaees, but he might cross 
anywhere along the line of his land, and might 
travel lengthwise as well as crosswise, unless, 
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indeed, the court should first determine, as mat-
ter of fact, that the proposed use would inter-
fere with the operation of the railroad. It can-
not be that the question is one of fact. If so, 
there would be no rule at all that could be relied 
upon. It would vary as often as a case arose 
with the adjoining owner. In view of the respon-
sibility of railroad companies for safely carry-
ing persons and property and the great hazard 
to human life and property from obstructions on 
the track, the power to exclude every one from 
the railroad limits must be left, as matter of 
law, absolutely with the officers of the company, 
who are immediately responsible, subject only to 
such State supervision as may be deemed expe-
dient, and such is the established doctrine, as de-
clared by a general eoncensus of legal authority.' 
It has been held that the owner of the fee has 
the right to cross the right of way, for purposes 
connected wit hthe use of his remaining land, and 
in a manner which will not interfere with the 
operation of the road, that he may lay pipes 
across underneath the surface for carrying oil, 
and that he may use the right of way for agri-
cultural purposes. But he may not permanently 
occupy the surface, as with buildings, a levee, or 
other work or structure.'' 
Many cases cited in notes. 
There being no proof whatsoever as to the necessity 
for the use of the whole of 1'ract ''A'' by the railroad 
company, we ask what justification is there for the court 
to have instructed the jury as it did, that the defendants 
bad no right to construct or maintain a mine track over, 
upon or across Tract ''A'' from the portal of tunnel No. 
lB 
1 (Abs. G72), or that Robbins would permit a trespass 
upon tlle exclusive rights of the plaintiff in the right of 
way, as announeed in Instruction No. 11 of the court, 
found at page 667 of the abstract, when the court was ju-
din.ially advised by solemn declaration, under oath, that 
tlw r•nn<lemnor had no use for the whole of such tract and 
tlt ·1 il1e use thereof by defendants would not and could 
noi "ffer~t the railway operation. 
'"l1y should the plaintif be compelled to take land 
an: ' 1'1' nxelusive possession then~of whieh it does not 
'"'- "l'l ean not use, pay the d0f'"'d 'nts' damages for 
pr ·><l and deprive them of the llPP which it is willing 
tk "lll<l have and which they el :v'l is of great value 
t ~ Chief Justice Black in iLn "ase of St. Louis 
r 'V. R. Co. vs. Clark says: 
rr'o1·e land and no greatw : · · """st in it need be 
1 qken thnn the public use ,. -.~ ... nd * * *. If the 
.. ;n·ht to make a proper ,- ~ the land is of 
. "UCfit to the OWTI0r Rll'1 . '10 neW burden 
'Y)f)n him, and it OOPS n ... rff'1'e with thf' 
nhljr~ UPC for whieh thp 1 .. 'a1mn, there if'l 
··w·son thnt he stJOu]rl 1 • ·n(l of that use, 
'
1 h·' paid its fnlJ V" ]pr· '"'0S." 
••
0 iR alm0st io0nti""' 
•
1
'"'1'' Co. vs. AllPn n" 
· ··" '"here tlw court ,,. 
/'"' the other hanrl :" 
.. ; ,l rrps ') nd tre~:d 1 (\ .. 
"·"" the f•·ee n.,.,. .. 
"•p rond. an· 1 • · 
~ "~" rlntriTnPnJ ' 
" f"ds in the 
' ,..jted in our 
,., l1arl built 
•, ;'1 n]·lees as 
.], nr teams 
., "r1 nassage 
n.l "'10 in no 
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way interfered with the use of the land for the 
purpose of the railroad, the defendant in error 
as a land owner had the right to enter upon 
such land and pass under such bridges and tres-
tle work with its teams and stock without being 
a trespasser.'' 
We submit that this is not only good law, but good 
common sense. What possible harm or ii'jury could come 
from the defendants running their mine cars across this 
tract of land and underneath the trestle of the railroad 
company~ Mining being a public use in this state, what 
possible defense could the railroad company make to a 
suit brought by the mining company to condemn such a 
right of way'? We frankly conceded such right upon the 
trial of this action, and we do not believe that the court 
was justified in making the plaintiff take such right from 
the defendants and compel plaintiff to pay damages 
therefor. 
This court decideu in the <~ase of Utah-Ida:ho Sugar 
Company vs. Stevenson, :34 Utah 184, in an opinion by his 
Honor, ,Judge Straup, that where an irrigation company 
had condemned a strip of land 150 feet wide and one-
half mile in length, through defendant't:l farm, that the 
owner of the land nould erect gates across the canal path 
and that although the same were objected to by the owner 
of the easement in that such gates interfered with the use 
of the path by its employees in driving horses along it 
in dredging the canal, which was necessary several times 
a year, the facts did not show an interference with the 
reasonable enjoyment of plaintiff's easement so as to pre-
clude a contrary finding. In this case the railroad com-
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pany not only did not object to the use of Tract A by the 
owners of the mining property, but invited such use by 
such owners. The defendants have the right now to go 
upon said Tract ''A'' and construct mining tracks un-
derneath the trestle and across such tract, and the rail-
road company would be in no position to contend that 
such use by the owners of the property interfered in any 
way with its easement in such tract. In fact, the railroad 
company would be powerless, under the decision of this 
Honorable Court, to prevent such use by the mining com-
pany or its lessees as it could not show any interference 
whatsoever with the easement acquired by it. The facts 
in the Stevenson case, we l'mbmit, are much stronger of an 
interference with the easement condemned than they 
would be in this case, as there eoul<i be none here. 
The above and foregoing errors arise in this case 
without regard to the amendment of the complaint by the 
plaintiff, and we therefore respectfully submit that the 
trial court, never having passed upon the question as 
provided in Section 3591 of Compiled Laws of Utah of 
1907, that the taking is necessary to such use, and in-
structing the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
exclusive possession of the land described in the com-
plaint of the plaintiff, eommitted grievous error against 
this plaintiff, and a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, ELLIS & SCHULDER, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
